Special Case: Viet-Nam

Viet-Nam has provided a voluntary contribution of $4,000 for UNFICYP (UNDPI 1996, 708). Viet-Nam has already passed the difficulties that Mexico has on dealing with peacekeeping. In the case of Viet-Nam, the candidacy to the UN Security Council is very important to base Viet-Nam as an emerging power in South East Asia. This is the main reason why they are interested in participating in UN peace operations, because Viet-Nam believes that its participation will increase its chance to obtain the seat. Also, “Viet-Nam, a one-party communist state, has one of south-east Asia's fastest-growing economies and has set its sights on becoming a developed nation by 2020” (BBC 2006bl, par. 1).

Initial variables of the data collection process:

UN/UN peacekeeping policy reform
Viet-Nam participates in international forums about UN reform and its participation is influenced by its membership at the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77, and these two elements and its strong interest in obtaining the non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council, are defining Viet-Nam’s foreign policy (Hastings 2006, par. 1). In a public statement made on January 2006, Viet-Nam said for the first time that it may join United Nations peacekeeping operations as the country seeks a seat on the Security Council as a non-permanent member (Ibid.). To Viet-Nam, participating as a non-permanent member of the Security Council is becoming crucial. "To make further contributions to UN common activities, Viet-Nam has decided to run for non-permanent membership of the Security Council for the 2008-2009 term," Foreign Ministry spokesman Le Dung said in 2006 (Ibid. quoting Le Dung 2006). Dung also said the country "is preparing so that when sufficient conditions warrant, Viet-Nam will participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations" (Ibid.).

Perception of peacekeeping
Viet-Nam has been reluctant to participate in a UN peacekeeping force, having experienced years of war mostly notably one with the United States that ended more than 30 years ago with more than 3 million Vietnamese and 58,000 American deaths (Hastings 2006, par. 2). Nevertheless, Viet-Nam acknowledges that it is part of its international responsibility to engage directly on issues of international security.

Domestic political environment
The Communist Party will continue to dominate the political scene in 2007-08 (EIU 2006ct, 1). However, there are signs that a more assertive National Assembly (legislature) is emerging, helping to strengthen government accountability (Ibid.). And as many other countries, corruption is still a problem. Thus, “attempts to tackle corruption in the administration appear to be more serious than previous efforts, and have high political backing, but the entrenched nature of vested interests means that progress will be slow” (Ibid.). These activities will increase the positive perception of the Vietnamese defence forces.

Domestic economic environment
The real GDP growth to remain strong: growth will be driven by expanding private investment, including high inflows of foreign direct investment encouraged by Viet-Nam’s prospective membership of the WTO, which the country is expected to join by end-2006 (EIU 2006ct, 1). The main reason for wanting to participate in UN peace operations is political (internal and foreign policy), thus economic reasons are not the main driving cause.

Military affairs
The People’s Army of Viet-Nam, created in 1944 as the party’s Armed Propaganda Team, ranks in influence only behind the party and the government (EIU 2006aw, 10). The military involvement can be described as follows:

Its roots in society are deep. In the past half-century it has confronted and humiliated armies from three of the world’s major powers: France, America and China. The army has always had a political dimension, and a defence white paper written in 1998 rejected depoliticization of the armed forces. Many senior officers (including the previous party general secretary, Le Kha Phieu) have moved on to top leadership positions in the Central Committee and the Politburo, although their number is now diminishing. In addition to a mainly conscript army of 412,000 (two years of military services is, in principle, required of all men), there is a navy of 42,000, an air and air defence force of 30,000, a border defence corps of 40,000, and reserves of about 4m in the urban People’s Self-Defence Force and the rural People’s Militia. (Ibid., 11)

The armed forces are less formidable (Ibid., 14). After Viet-Nam’s withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989 about 500,000 troops were demobilized (Ibid.). Since then, there have been sharp cuts in military spending, although a reduction in the influence of the armed forces has been tempered by continued suspicion of China, as well as by their enhanced internal security role (Ibid.). Viet-Nam is strengthening its military co-operation with India, providing advice on guerrilla warfare in exchange for help in maintaining its MiG fighter aircraft and in producing small and medium-sized weapons (Ibid.).

Foreign policy
Viet-Nam will continue to raise its profile with important foreign partners in 2007-08 (EIU 2006ct, 7).

Membership of the WTO, which is expected to be confirmed before the end of 2006, will assist with this objective. Relations with the US and the EU will continue to be dogged by concerns over human rights and religious freedoms, as well as commercial disputes stemming from Viet-Nam’s rapid export-led growth. Viet-Nam’s relations with China will continue to deepen in most spheres, partly reflecting a desire to ensure that it does not alienate its northern neighbor by growing too close to the US. On his first official trip abroad since retaining his post as party general secretary, Manh led a party delegation to China in August, during which both sides reaffirmed their determination to maintain strong ties. (Ibid., 8)

Also Viet-Nam seeks a non-permanent seat at the Security Council. In a public statement made on January 2006, Viet-Nam said for the first time that “it may join the United Nations peacekeeping operations as the country seeks a seat on the Security Council as a non-permanent member” (Hastings 2006, par. 2).

Additional variables found after the preliminary analysis:

Climate changes
No record.

Independent negotiations taken by DPKO to seek troops
No record.

Independent negotiations taken by contributor countries to engage non-contributor countries
Currently, the UK is engaged for training purposes in Viet-Nam.

Meetings organized by other international organizations to engage in dialogue about peacekeeping
Foreign ministers of the ASEAN were to gather on March 4, 2004 to flesh out a proposed formation of a regional peacekeeping force (Kyodo 2004, par. 1). The proposal, which was offered by Indonesia recently, would be a major pillar of an action plan for creating an ASEAN Security Community by 2020 (Ibid.).

The security community is one of three components envisaged by the Declaration of ASEAN Concord 2, popularly known as Bali Concord 2, signed by leaders of the 10-member group last October. Under the declaration, the leaders are committed to setting up an integrated ASEAN community by 2020 comprising the concepts of an ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community and an ASEAN Social and Cultural Community. According to a draft ASEAN Security Community action plan, an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force with a standby arrangement and its deployment mechanism will hopefully be established by 2012 to resolve member states’ internal conflicts comprehensively and peacefully. The ASEAN ministers are expected to adopt the action plan at the end of June, when they meet again in Jakarta for their annual ministerial gathering. The proposed peacekeeping force is intended to deploy neutral forces when a conflict happens in such places as Indonesia’s Aceh or the southern Philippines, where violence by separatists remain, an Indonesian official said. It is not clear whether the planned unit would be available for operations outside of the ASEAN region, for example, as part of a UN force. (Ibid., par. 6)